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The European legal framework on cybercrime: striving for 
an effective implementation. 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
This article analyzes the European legal framework on cybercrime. Initially, it argues the 
challenges of cybercrime to traditional criminal justice systems. Subsequently, it focuses on the 
criminal law framework on cybercrime with a mainly European perspective. The European legal 
framework provides a three-path solution: the reduction of frictions among national legislations, 
the introduction of new investigative powers and the facilitation of international cooperation. The 
article presents and discusses each solution. Further, it argues that the effective implementation of 
the main legal instruments does not seem to depend on the legal enforceability of these 
international measures. Contrarily, other, non legal, factors such as national security, politics, the 
economy and the public opinion appear to stimulate the spontaneous implementation of the 
European legal framework. In this context, the added value of the EU action is rather low, 
although the Treaty of Lisbon and the Stockholm Programme may improve this situation in the 
long term.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This article provides an overall picture of the European legal framework concerned with the 
repression of cybercrime. This matter has been subject to intervention by a number of international 
institutions worldwide, such as the United Nations, the G8, the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the Commonwealth, the Council of Europe (CoE) and the 
European Union (EU).
1
 From a European perspective, two international agreements are of 
particular relevance both for their (mainly) European focus and their legal effect: the 2001 Council 
of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (henceforth the CoE Convention) and the 2005 European 
Union Framework Decision on attacks against information systems (henceforth the FD) (Council 
of Europe, 2001; European Union, 2005).
2
 Cybercrime provokes such high international concern 
                                                     
1
 For detailed information about the initiatives of international institutions and organizations on 
cybercrime, see International Telecommunication Union, (2008), Schjolberg (2008) and Li (2007). 
2
 The Council of Europe is an international organization, established in 1949 and composed now by 
47 member states, with the aim of promoting democracy and protecting human rights and the rule of law in 
Europe. The European Union is an international organization founded in 1993 with the aim of extending the 
economic cooperation established under the European Economic Community (founded in 1957). It has 27 
Member States (MSs). On 1 December 2009 a new treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon, has entered into force. The 
new treaty has brought significant changes to the EU and in particular to the area of freedom security and 
justice (AFSJ), the EU sector relevant for the cooperation in criminal matters (see infra section 5). The 
Treaty of Lisbon has reframed the European treaties into a Treaty on European Union (TEU) and a Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, it has 
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because it has intrinsic characteristics which hamper its repression, and which are briefly described 
in section 1. In response to these distinctive features of cybercrime, the two above-mentioned legal 
instruments provide a three-path solution: the reduction of frictions among national legislations 
(section 2); the introduction of new investigative powers, as summarized in section 3; and the 
improvement of international cooperation (section 4). This paper presents the main provisions and 
criticisms relating to each path and concludes by discussing the problems relating to the 
implementation and effectiveness of the instruments (section 5).  
 
1. CYBERCRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
Cybercrime raises several challenges for traditional criminal law and the criminal justice 
system in general. The first challenge concerns its definition (McQuade III, 2006, 16-17; Marler, 
2002, 185; Gordon & Ford, 2006). The fashionable label ‗cybercrime‘ in fact covers different 
types of offences (Council of Europe, 2005, 87; Smith, Grabosky & Urbas, 2004, 7). This article 
follows the typologies of the CoE Convention. This conceptual framework has significantly 
influenced international and national legislation on cybercrime, including the EU policies. 
Therefore, it is useful in the analysis of the European legal framework on cybercrime. 
Furthermore, it allows to distinguish between cybercrimes where information systems are targets 
or instruments for crime (International Telecommunication Union, 2009, 18-19). Accordingly, the 
first group of cybercrimes comprises offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability 
of data and information systems (so called CIA offences) (McQuade III, 2006, 39). An example of 
these crimes is illegal access to a person‘s computer in order to collect or delete data. The second 
group are computer-related offences, where a computer is an instrument, though not an essential 
one, for the commission of a crime. An example is a credit card fraud perpetrated through a 
purposely designed internet site. A third group consists of content-related offences, such as child 
pornography and acts of a racist and xenophobic nature; these behaviours fall within the category 
of cybercrime when they are committed by means of a computer system. A fourth group concerns 
the infringement of copyright, as in the unauthorized copying and sale of computer software 
(Council of Europe, 2005, 87). 
A second challenge is that Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is complex 
and frequently unfamiliar to the traditional criminal justice world. Dealing with crimes involving 
these devices requires well-trained personnel in the investigation phase, during prosecution, and in 
courts. Technological and computer knowledge are somewhat alien to law enforcement and legal 
cultures, and states need to invest in training and education (Smith et al., 2004, 152). Since ICT 
constitute a rapidly growing and changing sector, operators must constantly retrain so that they are 
prepared for the new techniques and new modi operandi made possible by the advance of ICT 
(Chaikin, 2006, 12). Again, this flexible and constant approach may be unfamiliar to many 
criminal justice operators (Lewis, 2006, 1; Downing, 2005, 710). 
                                                                                                                                                               
been common to refer to the EU as to a structure with three pillars. These were the European Community 
(first pillar, regulated by the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC)), the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (second pillar) and the Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters, formerly 
Justice and Home Affairs until the Treaty of Amsterdam, entered into force in 1999 (third pillar) (both 
regulated by the former Treaty on European Union (TEU)). Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the objective of 
the III pillar has been the establishment of an AFSJ through police cooperation, judicial cooperation and 
approximation of legislation (Articles 2 and 29 of the former TEU).  
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As a third challenge, many cybercrimes occur in virtual environments like mobile phone 
channels or the internet. This feature frequently clashes with the main operational criteria of the 
criminal justice systems, namely sovereignty and the territoriality principle. The virtual nature of 
many cybercrimes requires countries to establish clear rules on a legal system‘s jurisdiction over 
these offences (Brenner & Clarke, 2005, 666; Downing, 2005, 719; Miquelon-Weismann, 2005, 
346; Weber, 2003, 426). Furthermore, these crimes frequently occur in different places, which 
may be under the jurisdictions of different countries. Consequently, there is a strong need for clear 
norms setting the priorities and competences of each country involved (Smith et al., 2004, 48; 
Brenner, 2006, 189-193; Csonka, 2004, 6-7).  
The fourth challenge is that the world of ICT moves at a pace different from that of physical 
world. Crimes occur in a fraction of a second and may spread with astonishing speed (Brenner & 
Clarke, 2005, 666; Csonka, 2004, 13). Additionally, evidence of cybercrime frequently consists of 
digital information, which is ephemeral by nature and can be altered or deleted. Law enforcement 
agencies must therefore take rapid action and be able to collect and preserve digital evidence for 
use in criminal proceedings (Chaikin, 2006; Csonka, 2004, 8-9).  
If criminal justice systems are to deal effectively with these problems relating to the 
repression of cybercrime, they must update their legislation and law enforcement systems where 
these are unable to cope with investigation and prosecution of the phenomenon. The above 
mentioned international agreements, the CoE Convention and the FD, seek to resolve these issues.
3
 
Their combined provisions constitute a three-path approach the reduction of frictions among 
national criminal laws; the provision of new investigative tools; and the improvement of 
                                                     
3
 Although the two legal instruments share a common goal, they differ in their nature and scope. The 
CoE Convention is an international treaty. In order for a treaty to become binding, a state must show its 
intention to be bound by it (becoming a party to the treaty) and the treaty must have entered into force 
according to the provisions set by the treaty itself (e.g. deadline, minimum number of adhesions). The treaty 
only binds the nations that have become a Party to it (Kierkegaard, 2007, 20-22). The CoE Convention has 
been adopted in Budapest on 23 November 2001. Although drafted by the CoE, the Convention is open for 
accession to non-CoE countries. As to April 2010, 46 states have signed the CoE Convention. The 
Convention has entered into force for 29 countries, including the United States of America. Five additional 
countries have been invited to accede (Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Philippines). Some 
scholars recognize that the drafting process of the CoE Convention was ―unusually open‖ (Lewis, 2006, 2; 
Downing, 2005, 711); others show opposite opinions, arguing that ―the development of the convention has 
been secretive and characterised as lacking in public consultation on the cybercrime issues‖ (Kierkegaard, 
2007, 22). Whatever the truth, the Convention has been partially amended in order to address some of the 
criticisms moved against the first drafts (Lewis, 2006, 3).  
The FD is a legal instrument exclusive of the EU action in the III pillar. Its objective is the 
approximation of national legislations of EU MSs. According to Article 34, ―framework decisions shall be 
binding upon the MSs as to the result to be achieved but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of 
form and methods‖. This obliges any EU MS to comply and implement EU Framework Decision within its 
legal system as an automatic consequence of being an EU MS (Mercado Kierkegaard, 2006, 382-383). FD 
may thus appear as powerful measures allowing to overcome the length and red tape involved in the process 
of entry into force of international treaties. However, the possibility to sanction an EU MS for a failure to 
implement and comply with a framework decision is rather theoretical than actual. This is because, in the 
framework of the III pillar, the European Commission did not have the power to bring a Member State 
before the European Court of Justice for failure to fulfil the obligations under a framework decisions, 
contrarily to what happens in the I pillar. Therefore, this power only rested within the action of other MSs, 
making this an unlikely and politically inconvenient possibility (Bernardi, 2007, 723). For the innovations of 
the Treaty of Lisbon on this issue, see infra (section 5). 
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international cooperation. The following sections summarize the main actions within each of these 
paths and briefly discuss criticisms and other issues arising from them. 
 
2. REDUCING FRICTIONS: THE HARMONIZATION AND APPROXIMATION OF 
CYBERCRIME LEGISLATION 
One major consequence of the virtual nature of many cybercrimes is that inconsistencies 
among criminal justice systems may hamper repression of the phenomenon. The perpetrator may 
be in a different jurisdiction from the victim, and the legal definitions of the criminal behaviour in 
the two legal systems may not match. Numerous difficulties may arise from this very simple 
situation. The country in which the perpetrator is present may not consider the conduct to be an 
offence. It may criminalize it, but as a minor offence punished with less than the minimum 
sanctions for international cooperation. Even if the penalty requirements for cooperation are 
present, this may not be possible because the offences do not fulfil the double criminality 
requirement (Smith et al., 2004, 86; Flanagan, 2005, 108). Especially for cybercrime, an 
excessively lenient criminal legislation or significant inconsistencies among national regulations 
may have detrimental effects. Criminals may fully exploit ICT and the virtual environment of the 
internet and focus their activities on the most tolerant legal systems and on the most vulnerable 
victims.  
One solution in order to solve and prevent these problems is overcoming the frictions among 
national legislations dealing with cybercrime. The convergence of legislations among European 
(and other) countries may offer a technical solution to many difficulties related to the current 
framework of international cooperation (Vermeulen, 2002; Manacorda, 2005).  
In this perspective, both the CoE Convention and the FD contain criminalization 
requirements. Both instruments share a common core constituted by three criminal offences 
concerning the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems. The first is 
the illegal access (Art. 2 of the CoE Convention and Art. 2 of the FD) consisting of intentionally 
accessing a computer system without the right to do so. Both agreements allow states to require 
the infringement of a security measure and exclude minor cases (Chaikin, 2006, 15-16). These 
options should grant some flexibility to national legal systems. They also take into account the 
trade-off between over-criminalization (thus seeking to punish all illegal accesses) and the specific 
selection of criminal illegal accesses (thus stimulating citizens to protect computer data and 
systems). Critics have argued that this may hinder achievement of the objective of harmonizing 
national laws (Flanagan, 2005, 110; Mercado Kierkegaard, 2006, 386). Further, scholars suggest 
that the requirement of the infringement of a security measure is probably the most sensible and 
efficient approach to the criminalization of illegal access (Brenner & Clarke, 2005, 659; Kerr, 
2003, 1599-1600). The possibility of limiting the scope of the criminalization of illegal access 
provided by the CoE Convention and the FD could hinder international cooperation for those 
countries that chose to have broader illegal access offences (Flanagan, 2005, 110). However, in the 
long term these problems may end up by incentivizing countries to restrict illegal access offences, 
so that they adhere to the most efficient models envisaged by scientific research (Brenner & 
Clarke, 2005). 
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The second common offence is system interference (Art. 5 of the CoE Convention and Art. 
3 of the FD). This occurs when someone intentionally hinders or interrupts the functioning of a 
computer by the inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering, suppressing or 
rendering inaccessible of computer data. The third common offence is data interference (Art. 4 of 
the CoE Convention and Art. 4 of the FD).
4
 It consists in a broad variety of behaviours (damaging, 
deletion, deterioration, alteration, suppression) affecting computer data, and which are illicit when 
committed without right and intentionally (Chaikin, 2006, 16). Both offences must be enacted 
without right and should be serious (CoE Convention and FD) or at least comprise ―cases which 
are not minor‖ (FD) (Chaikin, 2006, 17). Critics complained about the lack of definitions of 
notions such as ―intent‖ and ―serious hindering‖ (Mercado Kierkegaard, 2006, 386-387). The 
provision of stricter definitions of these deliberately broad concepts would probably have led to 
stronger reactions as to the identification and national origin of these definitions, giving rise to 
possible contrasts with different legal cultures.  
Notwithstanding a number of criticisms, it seems that the definitions of the three core 
offences contained in the two international agreements largely correspond. Indeed, harmonization 
of criminal law should not aim at unification or exact correspondence of national legislation, but 
rather tackle frictions and inconsistencies among national laws (Calderoni, 2010, 2-4). This is 
likely to incentivize a European (and international) consensus on the definitions of these offences 
(Valeri, Somers, Robinson, Graux & Dumortier, 2006, 18-19). Further, it is likely to reduce 
loopholes and inconsistencies among national legislations. 
Besides the above described offences, the CoE Convention covers several others 
corresponding to other types of cybercrime, such as illegal interception, misuse of devices, 
computer-related offences (forgery and fraud) and content-related offences (child pornography, 
infringements of copyright and related rights) (Downing, 2005).
5
 The FD instead provides for the 
criminalization of instigation, aiding and abetting and attempt to commit one of the three offences 
described above. It requires a minimum penalty of at least between one and three years of 
maximum imprisonment for illegal system interference and illegal data interference. It provides for 
aggravating circumstances (at least between two and five years of maximum imprisonment) for 
offences committed within the framework of a criminal organization or offences ―that caused 
serious damages or has affected essential interests‖. 
The European action against cybercrime is not limited to criminalization. It also introduces 
new investigative powers for the law enforcement agencies. 
 
                                                     
4
 According to Article 1 b of the CoE Convention (and Article 1 b of the FD), the term ‗computer 
data‘ denotes ―any representation of facts, information or concepts in a form suitable for processing in a 
computer system, including a program suitable to cause a computer system to perform a function‖. 
5
 It is necessary to recall the Additional Protocol to the Convention on cybercrime, concerning the 
criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems. The CoE 
Convention does not include offences covering these acts. This is because the drafters could not find an 
agreement on the criminalization of these behaviours (Council of Europe, 2003). Consequently, the drafters 
opted for an additional Protocol, which was signed on 28 January 2003 and entered into force, after the fifth 
ratification, on 1 March 2006. To date, 34 countries have signed the protocol, but only 17 have ratified it. 
The main problem related to the Protocol is its possible conflict with the freedom of expression (U.S. 
Department of Justice). 
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3. PROVIDING LAW ENFORCEMENT WITH THE TOOLS: NEW INVESTIGATIVE 
MEASURES 
Articles 14-21 of the CoE Convention require the Parties to introduce new investigative 
powers. The main consideration in this regard is that the new procedural rules have a broad 
application. They apply not only to offences envisaged by the first section of the agreement, but 
also to ―other criminal offences committed by means of a computer system‖ (Article 14, para 2 b), 
and even to the ―collection of evidence in electronic form‖ for any crime (Article 14 para 2 c). 
Hence, the measures of this section significantly affect the criminal procedure systems of the 
Parties. States must adopt laws allowing the activities stated by the CoE Convention, unless their 
national legislation already complies with it. The scope of application of these measures 
demonstrates that the need to modernize investigative tools extends beyond the fight against 
cybercrime. It encompasses all criminal activities, which, just like legal ones, increasingly use and 
benefit of ICT. There is no need for examples to demonstrate that the seizure and analysis of a 
suspect‘s computer or mobile phone may contribute significantly to ascertaining his/her innocence 
or guilt (Miquelon-Weismann, 2005, 342-343). 
The first investigative measure set out by the CoE Convention is the expedited preservation 
of stored computer data. It enables the authorities to order or obtain the preservation of specific 
digital information already stored. It allows the freezing for up to ninety days of a defined quantity 
of data of possible relevance to a criminal investigation in order to prevent its deletion and 
alteration. This should enable the authorities to obtain the authorizations required by national law 
before proceeding with seizure, search and other ways to obtain data disclosure (Downing, 2005, 
757-758). Furthermore, specific rules provide for the rapid availability of traffic data.
6
 Traffic data 
may be crucial for continuing criminal investigations while waiting for authorizations to 
disclosure. Article 17, para 1 a, allows to obtain traffic data ―regardless of whether one or more 
service providers were involved‖. State Parties are thus entitled to regulate the matter specifically, 
finding the solution that best suits their system (Council of Europe, 2001, 28). Article 17, para 2 b, 
obliges the person served with a preservation order to disclose to the authorities a ―sufficient 
amount of traffic data‖ to track the communication so that the perpetrator can be identified. 
The second measure is the ‗production order‘. This may oblige a) a person to submit 
specified stored information in his/her possession or control and b) a service provider to disclose 
subscriber information in the provider‘s possession or control. Subscriber information comprises 
the type of communication used, technical provisions, period of service (Art. 18, para 3 a), and 
other information available to the provider on the basis of the contract or agreement with the user 
(identity, address, contacts, payment information, etc.) (Miquelon-Weismann, 2005, 341-342).  
The third measure concerns the search and seizure of stored computer data. It allows the 
authorities to search a computer or other data storage device. Article 19, para 2, also allows for the 
automatic extension of the search to data stored in other computers accessible from the one being 
searched. Additionally, it enables to seize, copy, preserve and remove or make inaccessible the 
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 According to Article 1 d of the CoE Convention, traffic data are ―any computer data relating to a 
communication by means of a computer system, generated by a computer system that formed a part in the 
chain of communication, indicating the communication‘s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, 
or type of underlying service‖.  
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data. In order to speed up these activities, the authorities can order any person who has knowledge 
of the system, such as system administrators, to assist with the search.  
 The fourth and fifth measures concern the real-time collection of computer data. Article 20 
deals with traffic data and Article 21 with content data. These norms allow the authorities to 
intercept and/or order a service provider to assist them, or even to collect traffic data and content 
data directly. These measures provide for the interception of personal communication, a significant 
interference with the right to privacy and the right to communicate. They should apply only for 
serious crimes. Article 21 leaves to domestic law to select such offences. This is a mandatory 
selection for collection of the content of communications. It is only optional for the collection of 
traffic data. A Party may limit the collection of traffic data to a range of crimes. This list cannot be 
more restricted than the list of serious offences allowing interception of content data.  
The above described measures provide law enforcement authorities with a valuable ICT 
toolbox of investigative measures. Article 15 provides guarantees for privacy and freedoms. This 
provision cites the protection of human rights and liberties and expressly requires that 
investigative powers respect the proportionality principle (Council of Europe, 2001, 24). Para 2 of 
Article 15 lists possible safeguards national legislation may provide for, and particularly ―judicial 
or other independent supervision, grounds justifying application, and limitation of the scope and 
the duration of such power or procedure‖. In the letter of the CoE Convention it is evident a 
preference for a national approach. Domestic legislation shall establish both the conditions for 
exercising the above-described investigative powers and the safeguards against them. This 
relativism has been strongly criticized for failing to impose adequate procedural and substantial 
constraints on law enforcement agencies, thus possibly infringing citizens‘ rights and freedoms 
such as privacy rights and the privilege against self-incrimination (Archick, 2006, 4; Marler, 2002, 
204-205; Mercado Kierkegaard, 2006, 383-384; Kierkegaard, 2007, 22-23; Miquelon-Weismann, 
2005, 337-340). However, several scholars have argued that the CoE Convention respects human 
rights and freedoms, and that concerns about these issues should not be overemphasized (Marler, 
2002, 206-211; Lewis, 2006, 4; Keyser, 2003, 324-325; Li, 2007; Weber, 2003, 445; Archick, 
2006, 4; Lemos, 2001). To be sure, human rights and freedoms should be important priorities in 
drafting new criminal (international) legislation. The Council of Europe and the European Union 
both have specific instruments and procedures to protect human right and freedoms.
7
 The 
implementation of the new investigative measures by EU and CoE members is not an exception to 
this. In this perspective, it seems unlikely that the CoE Convention will significantly endanger 
human rights and freedoms in most European countries. Not surprisingly, scholars from non EU 
and non CoE countries were the most sceptic about this. Nevertheless, the relativist approach of 
the Convention appears justified not only because of the relatively high level of protection of 
human right in Europe. It appears a wise choice for extending the global adoption of the CoE 
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 The 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(also known as European Convention on Human Rights) was the first treaty of the Council of Europe. All 
new CoE members must ratify the Convention. The Convention sets up a number of basic rights and 
freedoms and creates the European Court of Human Rights, sitting in Strasbourg, France. The Court judges 
cases of infringement of the right enshrined in the Convention and is entitled to issue judgements which are 
binding for the concerned states. Within the European Union, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union sets up the rights of every EU citizen. The Charter was signed in 2000, but it has legal 
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Charter has the same legal value as the EU Treaties. 
Consequently, all EU MSs and institutions must respect the Charter. Since the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon, the EU is enabled to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights.  
8 
 
Convention. A treaty with stricter requirements as to guarantees would have discouraged its 
adoption by states, which are likely to be reluctant to introduce safeguards additional or different 
to the ones already provided by their national legislation. Consequently, stricter requirements 
probably would have jeopardized the main objective of the CoE Convention: the facilitation of 
international cooperation.  
 
4. FACILITATING COOPERATION: MINIMUM RULES IN A MORE COMPLEX 
FRAMEWORK 
The CoE Convention also includes several norms intended to facilitate international 
cooperation and to improve the repression of transnational cybercrime. Notwithstanding criticisms 
and problems of implementation (discussed below), the part of the CoE Convention on 
international cooperation is the core of the new treaty. It is widely viewed as the most important 
element because it enables expeditious actions in a sector where these are necessary, owing to the 
speed and changeability of cybercrime (Csonka, 2004, 26-27). 
Article 22 sets out rules concerning jurisdiction. Paragraph 4 explicitly excludes that these 
norms may conflict with a Party‘s jurisdiction on an offence established by its domestic law. 
Parties shall establish their jurisdiction over the offences defined by the CoE Convention when 
these occur in their territory. Additionally, they may establish their jurisdiction on offences 
committed on board a ship or an aircraft registered therein, by one of their nationals if the offence 
is punishable under criminal law in the territory where it is committed or is committed outside the 
jurisdiction of any state. Furthermore, Parties must establish their jurisdiction on extraditable 
offences in cases where they refuse to extradite the suspect on the basis of his or her nationality 
and the person is present on their territory, thus implementing the principle of aut dedere aut 
iudicare (hand over or try) (Council of Europe, 2001, 41). These provisions have been criticized 
for failing to address the most critical issue of jurisdiction over cybercrimes, i.e. positive 
jurisdictional conflicts (when more than one country claims to have jurisdiction over a crime 
(Brenner, 2006)). Conflicts of this kind are frequent in the case of cybercrimes, since computers 
and networks activities are rarely subject to physical and spatial restrictions. The CoE Convention 
only provides for a possibility of consultation among state parties in order to determine ―the most 
appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution‖ (Article 22 para 5). A merely possible mechanism of this 
kind is not likely to do much to solve positive conflicts (Miquelon-Weismann, 2005, 347). 
Furthermore, the focus on prosecution may lead to a prioritizing of law enforcement over the 
suspect‘s rights and freedoms (Kierkegaard, 2007, 25). Article 10 para 4 of FD supplements this 
shortcoming by requiring mandatory consultation among the MSs concerned, centralization of 
proceedings in one country (as far as possible) and providing three criteria for determination of the 
jurisdiction: place of commission of the offence, offender‘s nationality, and place of apprehension 
of the offender.  
In regard to extradition, Article 24 obliges Parties to consider the offences established by the 
CoE Convention, when punished with at least one year of maximum imprisonment, as extraditable 
offences under existing or future extradition treaties concluded between or among them. If no 
agreement exists between Parties, the Convention should be the legal basis for granting 
extradition. The Parties are required to implement the aut dedere aut iudicare principle for the 
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offences established by the CoE Convention (Council of Europe, 2001, 43), and they must provide 
the contact addresses of the authorities responsible for making or receiving extradition requests.  
Several provisions deal with mutual legal assistance. These concern not only the 
investigation and prosecution of crimes related to computer systems and data, but also the 
collection of evidence in digital form. These provisions are thus likely to apply to a wide variety of 
criminal proceedings dealing with cybercrimes and ordinary crimes (Council of Europe, 2001, 44).  
The CoE Convention has a subsidiary function. On the one hand, it provides a framework 
for mutual assistance when no other agreement exists between the requesting and requested 
Parties. States must designate a central authority responsible for such requests. National authorities 
must execute the requests according to procedures specified by the requesting Party.
8
 In cases of 
urgency, the requesting Party can sent requests directly to judicial authorities. The competent 
authorities are free to directly exchange requests not involving coercive action.  
On the other hand, other applicable treaties and national laws should have the priority 
(Article 27 of the CoE Convention). This allows mutual legal assistance operators to use more 
familiar instruments, such as, for example, the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters and its Protocol or the EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters. This rule is only a general principle and has several exceptions. In particular, Parties shall 
implement to the full extent the provisions on mutual assistance for the specific investigative 
actions provided by the CoE Convention (see above, section 2). For these measures, the 
Convention represents the legal basis for requests of mutual assistance in cases where an 
agreement is a condition for their fulfilment. Requests for the expedited preservation of stored 
computer data can be fulfilled without requiring dual criminality (Article 29 paragraph 3), unless a 
Party so reserves. In case of an expedited preservation, the requested Party must also disclose to 
the requesting one any service provider involved and the path of the communication. Furthermore, 
in case of a request of search or seizure of data, Article 31 paragraph 3 requires expedited response 
when there are grounds to presume that data are particularly vulnerable or other treaties or 
agreements provide for an expedited procedure.  
Mutual legal assistance provisions of the CoE Convention have received criticisms for not 
establishing adequate guarantees for due process and human rights. In particular, strong criticisms 
pointed out the lack of dual criminality requirements for granting assistance (Lemos, 2001; 
Kierkegaard, 2007, 26). In fact, these criticisms seem to be caused by the CoE Convention‘s 
above-mentioned relativism as to guarantees and safeguards, and by misunderstandings as to 
traditional mechanisms of mutual legal assistance. According to Article 25 para 4 of the CoE 
Convention ―mutual assistance shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the law of the 
requested Party or by applicable mutual assistance treaties, including the grounds on which the 
requested Party may refuse co-operation‖. This means that each country will continue to apply its 
traditional approach to assistance requests made by other Parties. Therefore, dual criminality will 
apply whenever national laws or other applicable international agreement provide for it. Indeed, in 
regard to dual criminality, the CoE Convention does not comprise innovations in comparison with 
other important international mutual assistance treaties, such as the 1959 European Convention on 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Article 5 para 1 a) and the 2001 United Nations 
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Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (Article 18 para 9). The only exception to the 
possibility to require dual criminality is, as already mentioned, provided by Article 29 para 3 for 
requests of expedited preservation of computer data for offences established in accordance with 
Articles 2-11 of the CoE Convention. This provision has been based on the consideration that the 
requirement of dual criminality may hinder the effective prompt preservation of data and that dual 
criminality may be assumed for the offences provided by the first part of the Convention (Council 
of Europe, 2001, no. 285). This option seems wise, also in consideration that further requests of 
assistance relating to the preserved data may be subsequently subjected to dual criminality checks 
(Weber, 2003, 434). 
Another important tool is the establishment of a network of national contact points for 
assistance and collection of evidence available on a 24/7 basis. The G8 meeting on 9-10 December 
1997 firstly established the network. The 24/7 Network is open to other countries, and the Council 
of the European Union has recommended MSs to join the network (European Union, 2001). To 
date, approximately 55 countries have done so.
 9
 Further, the lists of G8 and CoE national contact 
points are undergoing a process of consolidation (Polakiewicz, 2010). The CoE Convention places 
an obligation upon Parties to designate and adequately equip such national contact points. This 
should increase the number of countries adhering to the 24/7 Network (Csonka, 2004, 27-28). 
Further, the FD endorses the initiative, binding all EU MSs to establish a national contact point 
(Article 11 of the FD).  
The mechanisms of cooperation described above are likely to represent a minimum 
threshold. This is a consequence of the above-mentioned subsidiary nature of the CoE Convention, 
but most of all of the higher level of mutual cooperation established within the framework of EU 
legislation. In this regard, several measures have been adopted which directly or indirectly concern 
the repression of cybercrime. They include agreements on mutual assistance in criminal matters, 
such as the 2000 EU Convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters and its 2001 Protocol. 
The most innovative instruments in the EU context include measures implementing the principle 
of mutual recognition in criminal matters. Since the 1999 Tampere European Council, this 
principle is the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in the EU. Based on this principle, a series of 
framework decisions has introduced a significantly greater level of cooperation on criminal 
matters. The best-known of these measures are the European Arrest Warrant, and mutual 
recognition of freezing orders on property or evidence and of confiscation orders.
10
 More recently, 
new measures have further increased the application mutual recognition.
11
 Remarkably, the above-
mentioned instruments include computer-related crimes within their range of application. 
However, as already pointed out in the literature, the famous 32-item list of crimes not requiring 
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the application of the principle of double criminality raises doubts concerning its precision in 
defining the conducts concerned (Weyembergh, 2005, 1582; Peers, 2004; Manacorda, 2005). 
Indeed, the reference to ―computer-related‖ crimes is ambiguous, because the notion is broadly 
criminological rather than denoting specific offences. This is all the more significant if we 
consider that explicit reference to the provisions of the FD or of the CoE Convention could easily 
have resolved this issue, since the offences therein established are much more clearly defined. This 
concern is important for at least one Member State. In relation to the Framework Decision on the 
European Evidence Warrant (EEW), according to Article 23 para 4, Germany may issue a 
declaration subordinating the implementation of the EEW to verification of double criminality for 
a series of crimes, including computer-related ones (Council of the European Union, 2007, 26-39). 
Accordingly, Germany has declared that it may submit requests of EEWs requiring search and 
seizures to double criminality, unless the issuing authorities declares that the offence in question 
matches the CIA offences of the CoE Convention or the offences defined by the FD (European 
Union, 2008, 92).  
The CoE Convention and the EU cooperation framework are important achievements. 
However, their establishment is only a first step towards effective action against cybercrime. The 
following step is the implementation of international or European regulations into national 
legislations.  
 
5. STRIVING FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION: UNCERTAIN PERSPECTIVES 
The mechanisms of international law are slow and this may become a serious issue when 
addressing such a constantly-changing phenomenon (Csonka, 2004, 10-11). Indeed, the approval 
of international agreements is far from providing per se a common framework for the international 
repression of cybercrime. International law requires that states ratify treaties and implement them 
into national legislation. The implementation phase is of crucial importance for establishing a 
common approach to the issue of cybercrime (Miquelon-Weismann, 2005, 353). 
With regard to the CoE Convention, its global reach appears difficult. Indeed, in order to 
prevent safe havens for cybercriminals, the Convention should be adopted by far more countries 
than the current signatories/Parties (Archick, 2006, 3; Weber, 2003, 443-444; Li, 2007). 
Remarkably, some of the most important Members of the Council of Europe or signatory Parties in 
terms of population and GDP have not yet ratified or acceded to the treaty. They include Russia 
and Turkey (which did not even sign the treaty) as well as Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom, 
Canada and Japan (which have not yet ratified it). This points out the difficulties in the 
implementation of the CoE Convention even within the group of countries which are its main 
targets, at least in theory. Furthermore, in a global perspective, the current level of implementation 
is even lower. The majority of the world countries with the highest number of internet users have 
not signed/ratified the Convention.
12
 Even if the pace of ratification/accession is rather rapid 
compared with other international treaties, the current situation exhibits several shortcomings in 
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the implementation of the international framework on cybercrime. Although the Convention is 
already in force for more than 25 countries, and is potentially open to all states, full 
implementation of its content at global level – which is its ultimate ambition – still seems a long 
way off. Notwithstanding its uncertain global reach, the CoE Convention shows a remarkable 
indirect impact. Scholars recognize that it is a worldwide benchmark for cybercrime legislation, to 
which the FD itself and other instruments have conformed (Flanagan, 2005, 109).
13
 Several 
institutions and countries outside Europe took inspiration from the Convention in drafting their 
regulations (International Telecommunication Union, 2008; Gercke, 2009, 416; Picotti and 
Salvadori, 2008, 4).
14
 This element highlights that the mechanisms of implementation and 
harmonization go well beyond a strictly legal approach. Countries with no legal obligations to 
implement any international instrument have spontaneously drafted their national legislation in 
coherence with the provisions of the CoE Convention. If the legal (or ―direct‖) implementation of 
the CoE Convention appears difficult, its content represents a model for international 
organizations and countries around the world (―indirect‖ impact or implementation).  
A further issue related to the existence of the Convention is that it has halted or hindered 
further alternative solutions. Indeed, the possibility of providing the world with better international 
legal instruments may be impeded if not thwarted by the entry into force of the Convention, owing 
to the lengthiness of negotiations, the need to reach consensus, and procedures for signature and 
ratification (Weber, 2003, 443; Li, 2007). In this perspective, the strict adherence of other 
international instruments to the Coe Convention may have a double effect: on one side, it 
stimulates the implementation of the international rules; on the other side, it consolidates a core of 
minimum regulations, preventing further evolutions or developments. In the light of the current 
situation, it is unlikely that any important international organization (e.g. the United Nations) will 
ever attempt to depart from the CoE Convention to achieve a better legal framework on 
cybercrime. More probably, further international action will follow or build upon the basis of the 
CoE Convention.  
With regard to the FD, the deadline for its implementation by the MSs was 27 March 2007. 
The Council should have assessed the level of implementation of the FD by 16 September 2007. 
Only on 14 July 2008 did the Commission issue an evaluation report on implementation of the FD 
(European Commission, 2008). The report stated that by the deadline date for implementation, 
only Sweden had transmitted an (incomplete) document on its implementation measures. By June 
2008, only 23 out of 27 MSs had informed the Commission and 3 of them admitted they were still 
implementing the FD provisions into national law. Consequently, the Commission performed its 
evaluation only on 20 MSs out of 27 (European Commission, 2008, 2-3).  
The Commission based its report on information and documents provided by EU MSs. This 
is a serious methodological obstacle to any proper assessment.
15
 Indeed, it allows assessment only 
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of the legislation of the MSs that have provided information to the Commission. Furthermore, it 
implies an observation bias, since the Commission‘s analysis appears to be restricted to the 
documents provided by MSs, which are very likely to play down problems and inconsistencies in 
their implementation. Notwithstanding these problems, the Commission could not find a provision 
of the FD that all 20 MSs providing it with information have fully implemented. Compliance rates 
vary from 12 (in relation to liability of legal persons) to 19 (in relation to illegal data interference) 
out of 20 respondents. Again, this synthetic information on the implementation of the FD at the 
EU provides insight into the difficulties of European legal efforts to harmonize criminal 
legislation. The implementation of a brief though complex measure has required about 50% more 
time than expected. It is clear that even in a closely connected community such as the EU the 
actual implementation of the common measures shows significant problems. The fact that the CoE 
Convention already included most of the common measures further reinforces this impression.  
In the light of these considerations, the implementation of the European (and global) legal 
framework on cybercrime appears a very complex task. The mechanisms of international law and 
European law (at least under the old institutional framework of the III pillar) appear largely 
ineffective. The scarce implementation of the CoE Convention and of the FD by the members of 
the CoE and EU respectively are a striking example. From this it may be obvious to argue in 
favour of more strict legal tools to evaluate, control and sanction the level of implementation, both 
at the level of international law and European law. However, these tools have been discussed for 
years and in several sectors other than cybercrime. The relatively successful indirect 
implementation of the CoE Convention and its influence outside the boundaries of the signatories 
Parties argue in favour of a different explanation.  
The legal enforceability of international measures is only one factor for their actual 
implementation. Indeed, there are few cases where a country was forced to implement 
international measures against its own security interests, or against the will of its government, of 
its most powerful industries or of a strong public opinion. Security, politics, the economy and 
international reputation appear as much more determinant factors in this perspective. First, security 
is a key factor determining the implementation of international measures. The swift adoption of 
the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and of the Framework Decision on the 
fight against terrorism can be considered a reaction to the attacks of 11 September 2001. In this 
perspective, the international measures on cybercrime are increasingly connected to national 
security, especially in the protection of national infrastructures. Second, politics may influence the 
implementation of highly political international measures. The very well known problems in the 
adoption and implementation of international instruments against terrorism (at least until 2001) 
clearly reflect this point. The international measures on cybercrime (with the exception of the 
criminalization of act of racism and xenophobia through computer systems, prescribed by the 
Additional Protocol to the CoE Convention) appear less sensitive from a political point of view. 
Third, the national economy may influence the implementation of measures which may 
significantly affect some markets. The difficulties in the negotiations and ratification of 
international rules preventing climate change and reducing emissions provide an example of this 
influence. The international measures on cybercrime impact the business of internet service 
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providers and other market operators, requesting data and information to be stored. However, the 
characteristics of these markets may favour the implementation of international standards. Indeed, 
thanks to ICT, companies can access several national markets with more ease than in other, more 
traditional, sectors (e.g. automobiles, food, steel). Indeed, ICT provides the possibility to reach 
markets worldwide. The availability of common rules and standards is important to create a level 
playing ground and open the way to new markets. Fourth, international reputation may influence 
the implementation of measures receiving great attention from the public opinion. This is the case 
for international agreements on, for example, nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, genocide and war 
crimes. Countries not implementing these measures are stigmatized and their international 
reputation is affected by this. The international measures on cybercrime do not seem to have a 
similar impact on the public opinion.  
These elements contribute to a better explanation of the dynamics of the implementation of 
the current European framework on cybercrime. The legal obligations alone do not provide a 
sufficient explanation of the current level of implementation. Also countries with no legal 
obligations to implement the international measures are conforming their legislation to it. Security, 
political, economic and reputational factors are additional relevant variables. As discussed above, 
the international measures on cybercrime are increasingly linked to national security issues, do not 
entail excessively delicate political choices and may favour the establishment of a level playing 
ground for business. These factors may contribute to explain the indirect implementation of the 
content of the CoE Convention and the FD. For example, developing countries with big internal 
markets may not implement international standards to protect or favour national companies against 
foreign competitors (this may contribute to explain the current situation of China, India and 
Brazil). On the opposite, developed countries may need to show to their public opinion that 
something is moving in the fight against cybercrime (this may explain the situation of the United 
States, France and Germany).  
In this perspective, the added value of the EU action appears to be low. It does not provide 
an increased enforceability of the international measures and does not appear to stimulate the MSs 
from the point of view of national security, politics, the economy or the public opinion. As a 
result, the FD does not depart significantly from the CoE Convention. As already discussed, this 
choice may have a double effect: stimulation of implementation, but also consolidation of existing 
(and possibly insufficient) rules. Concerning the first effect, the analysis of the implementation of 
FD has showed that EU MSs are not particularly diligent in its implementation. Furthermore, EU 
MSs are not more virtuous in the implementation of the CoE Convention than non EU countries 
(16 out of 27 EU MSs against 13 out of 29 non EU MSs have ratified the Convention). This 
reflects the well know difficulties to reach a common agreement among EU MSs which are at the 
same time partners in the international and European scene, but competitors in the markets. On 
one side, they share security and law enforcement objectives. On the other side, they strive to 
protect and favour their national economy. As a consequence, the second effect is prevailing. The 
EU has adhered to the CoE Convention standards, renouncing to provide clearer rules, better 
instruments and guarantees in the field of cybercrime. The main differences relate to the presence 
of different and faster tools of international cooperation (e.g. mutual recognition instruments, EU 
agencies and networks such as Europol, Eurojust, European Judicial Network). This rather weak 
approach is frequent in the EU action in criminal matters and can be encountered in other fields, 
such as organized crime (Calderoni, 2010, 41-45).  
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Some new elements may impact on this situation. They are the Treaty of Lisbon and the 
Stockholm Programme.  
The Treaty of Lisbon entails the abolishment of the three pillar structure. The new 
institutional framework apply to economic policies as well as to the AFSJ. Concerning the latter, 
the role of many European institutions is strengthened. The Commission has a power of initiative, 
which is shared with a quarter of the MSs (Article 76 TFEU). The legal instruments (regulations 
and directives, terminology typical of the former first pillar) are adopted by the Council 
(deliberating with a qualified majority) and the European Parliament. The role of the European 
Court of Justice is extended. In particular, the Commission is entitled to bring the MSs before the 
Court for infringement on the obligations of the Treaties (Articles 258 and 259 TFEU).  
These innovations may provide new opportunities for drafting more specific and innovative 
legal measures in the field of cybercrime. In particular, the Commission may open infringement 
procedures against MSs not implementing the FD and the EU could adopt a new directive 
providing more detailed definitions on some unclear points, as demanded by the literature (Picotti 
and Salvadori, 2008, 12). However, a transitional measure significantly waters down these 
possibilities for the acts adopted under the former III pillar. Article 10 of the Protocol (no 36) on 
Transitional Provisions ―freezes‖ the new powers of the Commission and the Court concerning the 
infringement procedure for five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (unless the 
legal instruments are amended). The transitional measure reduces the impact of the new 
institutional framework, but may still allow the Commission to table a new proposal in the field of 
cybercrime. Even if this appears unlikely, by 1 December 2014 the infringement procedure will be 
applicable to the implementation of the FD. As discussed above, overestimating the enforceability 
of the obligations may be risky. However, this element may provide useful in stimulating the 
implementation by EU MSs. Indeed, the infringement procedure may bring political and public 
opinion reactions and ultimately shift the balance in favour of the implementation of the 
international measures on cybercrime. 
The Stockholm Programme is the successor of The Hague Programme and provides the 
guidelines and policies for the development of the AFSJ for the period 2010-2014 (European 
Union, 2009). The Stockholm Programme deals with cybercrime, stressing the importance of the 
full implementation of the CoE Convention and promoting better cooperation and understanding in 
the field of cybercrime. This does not seem to promote radical changes to the above described 
situation. The Stockholm Programme highlights the importance of ―effective implementation, 
enforcement and evaluation of existing instruments‖ (European Union, 2009, 6). Accordingly, the 
Programme provides the implementation of ―objective and impartial‖ mechanisms of evaluation. 
The Commission should therefore table one or more proposals for the evaluation of the EU 
policies in the AFSJ. In this perspective, the judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which 
includes the FD, should be the first sector to be evaluated. Furthermore, the new evaluation should 
include an ―efficient follow-up system‖ (European Union, 2009, 7). The improvement of the 
evaluation procedures may represent an important opportunity. Although frequently neglected in 
the literature, it may produce important advancements in the overall quality of EU legal measures 
and policies. Indeed, as discussed above, the current evaluation by the Commission is flawed and 
does not provide effective procedures to solve problematic issues. The possibility to establish 
effective and independent evaluation of the implementation of EU legal instruments may generate 
a reverse cascade effect. The Commission may have better arguments to support its infringement 
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procedures, MSs may pay more attention to the timely implementation of EU measures, the 
European institutions may be stimulated to draft legal instruments of better quality. 
In conclusion the current level of implementation of the European legal framework on 
cybercrime shows several inconsistencies. These relate more likely to the security, political, 
economic and reputational factors in the implementation of international measures rather than to 
their legal enforceability. At present, the EU action does not show a significant added value. This 
is confirmed by the problems in the implementation of the FD. The Treaty of Lisbon and the 
Stockholm Programme will bring some changes to this situation, but they are not likely to entail 
radical changes in the short term. Nevertheless, it is possible that in the long run they will 
stimulate a better implementation of the legal framework on cybercrime. Given the fast-changing 
nature of cybercrime, it is legitimate to wonder whether the current European legal framework will 
still be of any relevance once these changes will eventually become applicable.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Cybercrime poses important challenges to the European criminal justice systems. The 
above-described three-path approach is a significant endeavour to improve the European (and 
international) repression of cybercrime. Firstly, it introduces new tools for investigation of these 
crimes. Secondly, it harmonizes the national definitions of several computer-related offences. 
Thirdly, it provides a minimum framework for international cooperation on criminal matters. The 
legal framework provided by the CoE Convention has been generally considered a significant step 
forward in the international response to cybercrime (Li, 2007; Weber, 2003, 445; Flanagan, 2005, 
116; Lewis, 2006, 5; Downing, 2005, 761; Marler, 2002; Schjolberg, 2008, 11). As highlighted 
above, the European and international legal framework set by the CoE Convention and the FD has 
not been exempt from criticisms. Some of such criticisms may have been due to a 
misunderstanding of the general functioning of international cooperation in criminal matters or 
important concern for human rights and freedoms. However, the effectiveness and actual 
implementation of these international instruments remain the most critical issues. Indeed, their 
legal implementation shows some difficulties. However, the indirect implementation of these 
appears to be more successful. This supports the idea that non legal issues such as national 
security, politics, the economy and public opinion are more important factors than the legal 
enforceability in the implementation of these international instruments. Until present, the added 
value of the EU action in this sector appears relatively low. The Treaty of Lisbon and the 
Stockholm Programme may improve this situation, but this should not be expected to happen in 
the short period.  
In conclusion, the CoE and the FD constitute an important corpus of international law aimed 
at improving European and international cooperation against cybercrime. Notwithstanding the 
criticisms, they still appear as important achievements. However, their entry into force is only the 
first step towards their effective implementation, which is likely to be complex and will probably 
raise further issues.  
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